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1978] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
liberal disclosure policies expressed in CPLR 3101 against the effect
that extensive discovery might have on the parties in a matrimonial
action.
Audrey Rogers
ARTICLE 32-ACCELERATED JUDGMENT
CPLR 3215: A defendant in default is entitled to an assessment of
damages on the question of reasonable cover
Under CPLR 3215, a default judgment may be obtained against
a defendant who has failed to proceed in an action.112 Once the
defendant has conceded liability by defaulting, the plaintiff must
apply to the court for a judgment, and an inquest must be con-
ducted to determine damages.' If the plaintiff's claim is for a "sum
certain," however, the statute authorizes the court clerk to enter a
judgment without further hearing.1 Recently, in Reynolds Securi-
ties, Inc. v. Underwriters Bank & Trust Co.," 5 the Court of Appeals
clarified the scope of the right to automatic entry of judgment,
holding that a defaulting defendant in a contract action is entitled
to an inquest when the plaintiff requests reimbursement for the
,,2 CPLR 3215(a) (1970) provides:
When a defendant has failed to appear, plead or proceed to trial of an action
reached and called for trial, or when the court orders a dismissal for any other
neglect to proceed, the plaintiff may seek a default judgment against him. If the
plaintiff's claim is for a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made
certain, application may be made to the clerk within one year after the default. The
clerk, upon submission of the requisite proof, shall enter judgment for the amount
demanded in the complaint or stated in the notice served pursuant to subdivision
(b) of rule 305, plus costs and interest . . . .Where the case is not one in which
the clerk can enter judgment, the plaintiff shall apply to the court for judgment.
"' CPLR 3215(a) (1970). CPLR 3215(b) (1970) gives the court the authority to make
findings of fact on the issue of damages or to direct the question to a jury or a referee. In
order to establish his right to entry of judgment, the plaintiff must "file proof of service of
the summons and the complaint, or a summons and notice. . . and proof by affidavit...
of the facts constituting the claim, the default and the amount due." CPLR 3215(e) (1970).
If a verified complaint was served, it may be used in place of an affidavit. Id. Where the
statute requires the application for entry of judgment to be made to the court, a defendant
who has appeared in the action must be given at least 5 days notice of the time and place of
the application. If the defendant has not appeared, notice is required only if the defendant
serves a written demand on the plaintiff. CPLR 3215(f)(1)-(2) (1970). Where the application
can be made to the court clerk no form of notice is required, CPLR 3215(f)(1) (1970).
"I See note 112 supra. Where the plaintiffs claim is for a sum certain, the court clerk
may enter judgment without notice to the defendant upon the plaintiff's submission of proof
of service of process and an affidavit or verified complaint supporting his request for damages.
CPLR 3215(e)-(f) (1970).
Is 44 N.Y.2d 568, 378 N.E.2d 106, 406 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1978), rev'g 57 App. Div. 2d 522,
393 N.Y.S.2d 568 (1st Dep't 1977).
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reasonable cost of cover." 6 Significantly, the Court also stated that
the general rule prohibiting discovery against a defaulting defen-
dant" is not applicable when the defendant contests the extent of
his liability for damages."'
In Reynolds Securities, the plaintiff brokerage firm had exe-
cuted three separate sales of securities at the defendant's request.",
When the defendant failed to deliver the stock certificates, plaintiff
was forced to purchase equivalent securities in the open market to
cover the transaction. Since the stock had appreciated in value
during the intervening 2 months, the plaintiff suffered a net loss
and sued the defendant for the difference between the price it paid
for the stock and the amount it received on the sale.' 0 After the
defendant "willfully refused to comply with several discovery no-
tices" and court orders directing him to appear for a deposition, the
"plaintiff obtained an ex parte order striking the [defendant's]
answer'2' and directing entry of a judgment for the full amount
demanded in the complaint.' ' 2  The defendant moved to vacate the
judgment, arguing that he should have been permitted to contest
the extent of the plaintiff's damages at a separate inquest. ' The
motion was denied and the Appellate Division, First Department,
dismissed the defendant's appeal.21 4
44 N.Y.2d at 573, 378 N.E.2d at 109, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 746.
", Generally, if all the issues in controversy are resolved by a default, discovery is not
available against the defaulting party. See, e.g., Kozuch v. Bachmann, 244 App. Div. 250,
278 N.Y.S. 950 (1st Dep't 1935); Syracuse Mortgage Corp. v. Kepler, 122 Misc. 95, 202 N.Y.S.
193 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1923).
"' 44 N.Y.2d at 573, 378 N.E.2d at 110, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
' Id. at 570-71, 378 N.E.2d at 108, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
'2 Id. at 571, 378 N.E.2d at 108, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 745. The plaintiff also sought to recover
unpaid brokerage commissions. Id.
121 Id.; see 3A WK&M 1 3126.04. CPLR 3126 empowers the court to impose a number of
sanctions upon a party who willfully refuses to obey an order for disclosure. Among the
harshest of these penalties is the entry of a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff. See
CPLR 3126(3) (1970). It has been suggested, however, that this "ultimate of CPLR 3126's
sanctions . . . be reserved only for that instance in which a party has refused to submit to
any disclosure at all, such as where he refuses to appear for a deposition." CPLR 3126,
commentary at 649 (1970).
' 44 N.Y.2d at 571, 378 N.E.2d at 108, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 745. The lower court ordered
entry of judgment for the full amount demanded despite the plaintiff's failure to submit an
affidavit or verified complaint as required by CPLR 3215(e). 44 N.Y.2d at 573 n.3, 378 N.E.2d
at 109 n.3, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 746 n.3; see W.T. Grant Co. v. Payne, 64 Misc. 2d 797, 799, 315
N.Y.S.2d 910, 913 (Steuben County Ct. 1970); note 114 supra.
212 44 N.Y.2d at 571, 378 N.E.2d at 108, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
21 57 App. Div. 2d at 522, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 569. The appellate division stated that "lain
inquest [is] not necessary . . . '[i]f the damages, though unliquidated, can be established
by paper alone and do not require oral testimony .... .' Id., 393 N.Y.S.2d at 569 (quoting
CPLR 3215, commentary at 868 (1970)). In concluding that an inquest was not necessary, the
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed,'25 finding that cost
of cover is not a "sum certain,""'2 since extrinsic proof is necessary
appellate division appeared to assume that an affidavit or verified complaint will suffice as
a basis upon which the court can fix a sum originally uncertain and order judgment in that
amount without an inquest. Thus, the appellate division would seem to sanction the fixing
of damages solely on the papers even where the defendant wishes to offer other opposing
evidence at an inquest. See D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PaACTICE 348 & n.11 (1978). It has been
suggested that this aspect of the appellate division's decision in Reynolds Securities survives
the Court of Appeals' decision to the extent that it allows an assessment on the papers only
where "the defendant does not insist on a hearing of the damages issue." CPLR 3215, com-
mentary at 180 (Supp. 1978-1979).
I" At the outset, the Court ruled that the defendant's appeal was not precluded by CPLR
5511 (1970), 44 N.Y.2d at 571 n.1, 378 N.E.2d at 108 n.1, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 745 n.1, which
provides that "[a]n aggrieved party. . . may appeal from any appealable judgment or order
except one entered upon the default of the aggrieved party." This determination appears
consistent with earlier decisions permitting appeal of "the proceedings on a contested inquest
[or] intermediate order 'necessarily affecting' the final determination." James v. Powell, 19
N.Y.2d 249, 256 n.3, 225 N.E.2d 741, 744 n.3, 279 N.Y.S.2d 10, 15 n.3 (1967) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted); McClelland v. Climax Hosiery Mills, 252 N.Y. 347, 169 N.E. 605,
modified mem. on other grounds, 253 N.Y. 533, 171 N.E. 770 (1930); Hotel Martha Washing-
ton Management Co. v. Swinick, 71 Misc. 2d 982, 983, 337 N.Y.S.2d 976, 978 (Sup. Ct. App.
T. 1st Dep't 1972); H. COHEN & A. KARGER, THE PowEms OF THE NEW Yoa COURT OF APPEALS
§ 93, at 401-03 (1952); 7 WK&M 5511.11. But cf. Intrabartolo v. Intrabartolo, 38 App. Div.
2d 711, 329 N.Y.S.2d 646 (2d Dep't 1972) (defendant cannot appeal default judgment result-
ing from his nonappearance).
In 44 N.Y.2d at 572-73, 378 N.E.2d at 109, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 746. The Reynolds Securities
Court characterized the issue of what constitutes a sum certain as "seemingly commonplace,
but a source of more controversy than one would expect." Id. at 570, 378 N.E.2d at 108, 406
N.Y.S.2d at 745. Since the source of the sum certain requirement is FED. R. Cirv. P. 55(b),
the interpretations of rule 55(b) may be helpful in interpreting CPLR 3215. 1965 Op. N.Y.
ATT'y GEN. 187. A sum certain under the federal rules requires more than "generalized
statements of amount due." Anderson v. United States, 182 F.2d 296, 297 (1st Cir. 1950). See
generally 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2683 (1972). More-
over, the Reynolds Securities Court's determination that reasonable cost of cover is not a sum
certain seems consistent with the traditional New York view. See, e.g., McClelland v. Climax
Hosiery Mills, 252 N.Y. 347, 169 N.E. 605, modified mem. on other grounds, 253 N.Y. 533,
171 N.E. 770 (1930) (damages for breach of employment contract not a sum certain); Card
v. Polito, 55 App. Div. 2d 123, 389 N.Y.S.2d 696 (4th Dep't 1976) (damages in personal injury
action not a sum certain); Maxwell v. First Port Jefferson Corp., 31 App. Div. 2d 813, 297
N.Y.S.2d 885 (2d Dep't 1969) (claim for quantum meruit not a sum certain); Merchants Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Magee, 29 App. Div. 2d 841, 287 N.Y.S.2d 477 (4th Dep't 1968) (amount of
commissions and charges not a sum certain); Geer, Du Bois & Co. v. O.M. Scott & Sons Co.,
25 App. Div. 2d 423, 266 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1st Dep't 1966) (per curiam) (reasonable value of
advertising work not a sum certain); Hotel Syracuse, Inc. v. Brainard, 256 App. Div. 1055,
10 N.Y.S.2d 892 (4th Dep't 1939) (per curiam) (damages equivalent to fixed sum plus percen-
tage of profits not a sum certain); Strulson v. Pollack, 33 Misc. 2d 177, 230 N.Y.S.2d 395 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1962) (amount of damages for failure to purchase bond not a sum certain);
Davis v. Sisti, 3 Misc. 2d 132, 148 N.Y.S.2d 76 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1955) (amount due
on note plus reasonable attorney's fees not a sum certain); cf. John Malasky, Inc. v. Mayone,
54 App. Div. 2d 1059, 388 N.Y.S.2d 943 (3d Dep't 1976) (rent arrears are a sum certain).
Additionally, the Court noted that even if the claim had been one for a sum certain, the
clerk was without authority to enter judgment since the plaintiff did not submit either an
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to establish that the covering purchase was commercially reasona-
ble.'2 Thus, the Court concluded, the defendant should have been
afforded an opportunity to contest the amount of damages.ss Judge
Fuchsberg, who authored the unanimous Court's opinion, then con-
sidered the plaintiff's right to use discovery in preparation for an
inquest on the issue of damages. Noting that pretriAl discovery ordi-
narily is not available against "a party whose default has left no
issues to be tried,' '1 9 Judge Fuchsberg reasoned that such a rule
should not be applied "where a defendant may intend to testify at
an inquest or appears to possess highly pertinent evidence relevant
to damages. ' 30 Moreover, in the event that the defaulting defen-
dant continued his refusal to cooperate in discovery, Judge Fuchs-
berg suggested that, in addition to the sanction of contempt,'3 ' the
affidavit or a verified complaint. 44 N.Y.2d at 537 n.3, 378 N.E.2d at 109 n.3, 406 N.Y.S.2d
at 746 n.3.
'" 44 N.Y.2d at 572-73, 378 N.E.2d at 109, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 746 (citing N.Y.U.C.C. § §
1-204(2), 2-712 (McKinney 1964)). In the Court's view, the defendant's allegation that the
"plaintiff unduly delayed its purchase of the covering securities" raised sufficient factual
issues to warrant an inquest on the extent of the plaintiff's damages. The Court also found
that the defendant should have been given an opportunity to challenge the "correctness of
the [plaintiffs] calculations of the commissions." 44 N.Y.2d at 572-73, 378 N.E.2d at 108-
09, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 745-46.
212 44 N.Y.2d at 573, 378 N.E.2d at 109, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 746; see McClelland v. Climax
Hosiery Mills, 252 N.Y. 347, 169 N.E. 605, modified mem. on other grounds, 253 N.Y. 533,
171 N.E. 770 (1930); Appeal Printing Co. v. Levine, 69 Misc. 2d 76, 329 N.Y.S.2d 110 (N.Y.C.
Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1971); Glove City Amusement Co. v. Smalley Chain Theatres, Inc., 167
Misc. 603, 4 N.Y.S.2d 397 (Sup. Ct. Madison County 1938); FIFrEENTH ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD.
COUNCIL 301-03 (1949); 4 WK&M T 3215.09.
'" 44 N.Y.2d at 573, 378 N.E.2d at 109, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 746; see note 117 supra.
' 44 N.Y.2d at 573, 378 N.E.2d at 110, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 747. A similar view was ex-
pressed in dictum in Bearman v. Bearman, 28 App. Div. 2d 673, 674, 280 N.Y.S.2d 988, 989
(1st Dep't 1967) (per curiam), wherein the court stated: "[W]e do not regard the default as
per se prohibiting [the] examination [of the defendant] . . . ." See M. JACOBS, EXAMINA-
TIONS BEFORE TRIAL 213 (1950); CPLR 3105, commentary at 345 (1970). Judge Fuchsberg
observed that the rule prohibiting discovery against defaulting parties was based on the
assumption that additional information was not "material and necessary" to the prosecution
of the action. 44 N.Y.2d at 573, 378 N.E.2d at 109, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 746; see Kozuch v.
Bachmann, 244 App. Div. 250, 278 N.Y.S. 950 (1st Dep't 1935). In cases like Reynolds
Securities, however, where the "defendant may intend to testify at an inquest" or
"possess[es] highly pertinent evidence relevant to damages," such a rule is inapplicable. 44
N.Y.2d at 573, 378 N.E.2d at 110, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 747. It should be noted that, in reviewing
the background of this traditional rule, the Reynolds Securities Court suggested that it may
not have "retained its efficacy under more modem practice statutes." Id.
I"3 See, e.g., Equitable Lumber Corp. v. Northeastern Constr. Corp., 43 App. Div. 2d 845,
351 N.Y.S.2d 21 (2d Dep't 1974); Burchell v. Cimenti, 38 App. Div. 2d 897, 329 N.Y.S.2d
347 (1st Dep't 1972) (per curiam). But cf. Glenmark, Inc. v. Carity, 17 App. Div. 2d 126, 232
N.Y.S.2d 444 (1st Dep't 1962) (per curiam) (defendant's failure to answer in examination
before referee not contemptuous since referee not empowered to direct defendant to answer).
The sanction of contempt against a party for failure to obey an order of disclosure is not
specifically listed in CPLR 3126. Despite the apparent intent of the legislature to exclude
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court could either exclude any evidence offered by the defendant,' 2
or permit the plaintiff to rely on "lesser and more informal
proofs.'33 Thus, the defendant would not be allowed to obstruct
indefinitely the plaintiffs proof of damages.
The Reynolds Securities decision clarifies the rights and obliga-
tions of the parties under CPLR 3215 and leaves unchanged the
defaulting defendant's right to litigate the issue of damages.' 34 In
contempt as a remedy, see CPLR 3126, commentary at 642 (1970), there are instances when
contempt may be more effective than any of the other sanctions. Contempt might be used
when there are multiple parties and only one fails to disclose. In such a case, the impact of
default would be unfair to the cooperative parties. Id. at 643. Contempt, however, should be
used only where other remedies are ineffective. Id. at 644.
"1 44 N.Y.2d at 574, 378 N.E.2d at 110, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 747 (citing Brown v. Hilton
Hotels Corp., 25 App. Div. 2d 646, 269 N.Y.S.2d 930 (lstDep't 1966) (mem.); Burgin v. Ryan,
238 App. Div. 122, 263 N.Y.S. 242 (2d Dep't 1933) (per curiam)). CPLR 3126(2) permits the
court to issue a preclusion order to prevent an uncooperative party from raising issues related
to the material sought. The preclusion order often is used as an alternative to striking out
pleadings when the information withheld is relevant to only one isolated issue in the case.
See, e.g., Feingold v. Walworth Bros., 238 N.Y. 446, 450, 144 N.E. 675, 676 (1924); In re Estate
of Porter, 64 Misc. 2d 1016, 1017, 316 N.Y.S.2d 504, 506 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1970).
in 44 N.Y.2d at 574, 378 N.E.2d at 110, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 747 (citing Bigelow v. RKO
Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264-65 (1946); In re Estate of Rothko, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 323,
372 N.E.2d 291, 298, 401 N.Y.S.2d 449, 456-57 (1977); Randall-Smith, Inc. v. 43rd St. Estates
Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 99, 106, 215 N.E.2d 494, 498, 268 N.Y.S.2d 306, 312 (1966); Wakeman v.
Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co., 101 N.Y. 205, 209, 4 N.E. 264, 266 (1886)). The Rothko Court
held that "where the conduct of wrongdoers has rendered it difficult to ascertain the damages
suffered with the precision otherwise possible," the trial court may "resort to reasonable
conjectures and probable estimates" to determine the damages. 43 N.Y.2d at 323, 272 N.E.2d
at 298, 401 N.Y.S.2d at'457 (citations omitted). Moreover, in Bigelow the Supreme Court
stated that, where the defendant's initial wrongdoing has damaged the plaintiff in a way that
is not readily measured, the damages may be estimated. 327 U.S. at 264-65. The rule articu-
lated in the Bigelow case is the exception to the general rule that damages in a contract action
must be certain. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERmLO, CoNrRAcrs § 14-8, at 531 (2d ed. 1977).
'3 The Reynolds Securities decision represents the first time that the Court of Appeals
has addressed directly the CPLR's default procedures. The CPLR's predecessor, the CPA,
however, contained essentially the same provisions for defaults, see CPA 485 to 494-a (1962);
FmST REP. 93, 96, and the case law under the CPA allowed a defendant in default to appear
at an inquest and oppose damages. See, e.g., McClelland v. Climax Hosiery Mills, 252 N.Y.
347, 169 N.E. 605, modified mem. on other grounds, 253 N.Y. 533, 171 N.E. 770 (1930); Gise
v. Brooklyn Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Children, 236 App. Div. 852, 259 N.Y.S. 562
(2d Dep't 1932) (per curiam); Glove City Amusement Co. v. Smalley Chain Theatres, Inc.,
167 Misc. 603, 4 N.Y.S.2d 397 (Sup. Ct. Madison County 1938). In addition, prior to Reynolds
Securities, several lower New York courts interpreting CPLR 3215 concluded that a defaulting
defendant has a right to appear and oppose the plaintiff's proof of damages. See Schutzer v.
Berger, 40 App. Div. 2d 725, 337 N.Y.S.2d 71 (2d Dep't 1972); Appeal Printing Co. v. Levine,
69 Misc. 2d 76, 329 N.Y.S.2d 110 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1971); see 4 WK&M 3215.26,
at 32-274.
One of the primary differences between the CPA and the default sections of the CPLR
lies in the former statute's provisions governing a plaintiffs right to automatic entry of
judgment. Unlike CPLR 3215, CPA 485 specified the situations in which the court clerk could
enter judgment without an inquest to determine the amount of damages. An inquest was
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recognizing this right, the Court appears to have adopted the posi-
tion that a default judgment is designed not to punish, but rather
to aid the plaintiff in establishing the liability of a defendant who
fails to proceed.'35 Moreover, the Court appears to have rejected any
possible arguments for distinguishing between default for failure to
comply with discovery orders and default for other reasons. Signifi-
cantly, the opinion also suggests realistic procedures which may be
invoked if the defendant remains uncooperative during the inquest
phase of the proceedings.'36
The Reynolds Securities opinion, however, has created some
uncertainty concerning the defaulting defendant's right to depose
the plaintiff on the issue of damages. In stating that "as a result of
his default, the defendant has now forfeited his right to take the
unnecessary, for example, when the plaintiff sought damages for breach of an express contract
to pay money fixed by the terms of the contract or capable of being ascertained therefrom
by computation. Similarly, automatic entry of judgment was available when the underlying
cause of action was for breach of express or implied contract to pay a sum received or
disbursed, the value of property delivered, services rendered, or for a sum of money only. CPA
485 (1962). Thus, the cases decided under the CPA focused on whether a particular demand
for relief was listed in the statute, and not whether the demand was for a "sum certain." See,
e.g., Sobel v. Sobel, 254 App. Div. 203, 4 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1st Dep't 1938); Kearns v. Ceretta,
139 N.Y.S.2d 3 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1955); Rappazzo v. Nardacci, 20 Misc. 2d 301, 198
N.Y.S.2d 357 (Albany City Court 1959).
1 The opinion implicitly recognizes that a defendant is not to be adversely affected on
the damages issue merely because he defaulted on liability. Historically, a default constituted
an admission of all traversable allegations in the complaint. Since an allegation of damages
is not a traversable allegation, however, a default is not tantamount to an admission on the
damages issue. E.g., McClelland v. Climax Hosiery Mills, 252 N.Y. 347, 351, 169 N.E. 605,
606-07, modified mem. on other grounds, 253 N.Y. 533, 171 N.E. 770 (1930); Emery v. Baltz,
94 N.Y. 407, 412 (1884); Wine Antiques, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 40 App. Div.
2d 657, 336 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1st Dep't 1972) (per curiam), aff'd mem., 34 N.Y.2d 781, 315
N.E.2d 813, 358 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1974); 4 WK&M 3215.25. A similar approach is reflected in
modem practice principles which allow the defendant to concede liability while preserving
the right to offer proof on the question of damages when the amount due is the only issue in
dispute. It is submitted that the same approach should be followed in cases such as Reynolds
Securities, where the defendant's liability was established by default rather than concession
or stipulation. Although in many instances the defendant's refusal to proceed or obey discov-
ery orders may be designed to hamper the proof of the plaintiff's case, his motive also may
be "to concede liability but keep abreast of the progress of the litigation, perhaps as concerns
codefendants or an assessment of damages." CPLR 3105, commentary at 345 (1970). In such
cases, the defendant would be more likely to default by reason of failure to proceed or comply
with discovery than by reason of failure to appear, since, if he opted for the latter course, he
would not be entitled to notice otherwise required by the CPLR. CPLR 3105 (1970). It
therefore seems unduly harsh to penalize a defendant who appears but elects not to cooperate
in discovery by extending the consequences of his default and foreclosing his right to contest
damages.
"1 44 N.Y.2d at 574, 378 N.E.2d at 110, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 747; see notes 131-133 and
accompanying text supra.
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
plaintiffs deposition, 11' 7 the Court appears to have retreated from
the position that default procedures are not intended to be punitive
and that proof of damages should be separate from proof of liabil-
ity. '3 It is submitted that the defaulting defendant should be able
to examine the plaintiff on the question of the extent of damages.139
A contrary view would undermine the Reynolds Securities holding
by preventing the defendant from fully utilizing his right to appear
and oppose plaintiff's proof of damages.1 0 It is therefore suggested
that, when the issue is squarely presented, the Court should reject
the Reynolds Securities dictum in favor of a more equitable rule
giving the defendant full discovery rights for purposes of any post-
judgment damages inquest.
Michael Jacobellis
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW
CPL § 190.52: Statute amended to give grand jury witnesses limited
right to counsel
Historically, counsel for a grand jury witness was excluded from
the grand jury room'4' in order to preserve the secrecy of grand jury
'3 44 N.Y.2d at 573, 378 N.E.2d at 109, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 746. The Court cited no author-
ity in support of its position that the defendant was precluded from deposing the plaintiff. It
is possible, however, that the Court was referring to CPLR 3102(d) (1970), which prohibits
examinations during and after the trial, except by order of the trial court or to aid in the
execution of judgment. CPLR 3102, commentary at 267 (1970). Nevertheless, the cases de-
cided before Reynolds Securities indicated that such a rule might not be applicable when a
defendant is seeking information to assist him in a post-judgment damages inquest. See note
140 infra. See generally 3A WK&M 3102.19.
' See notes 134-135 and accompanying text supra.
' See CPLR 3102(d) (1970); note 137 supra.
'Q Although the New York courts have not specifically ruled that the defaulting defen-
dant may examine the plaintiff, it has been held that where plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment has been granted, defendant may examine the plaintiff prior to the assessment of
damages. See, e.g., Appeal Printing Co. v. Levine, 69 Misc. 2d 76, 329 N.Y.S.2d 110 (N.Y.C.
Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1971); Shemitz v. Junior Center, Inc., 74 N.Y.S.2d 34 (N.Y.C. City Ct.
N.Y. County 1947); CPLR 3102, commentary at 65 (Supp. 1978-1979). In Glove City Amuse-
ment Co. v. Smalley Chain Theatres, Inc., 167 Misc. 603, 4 N.Y.S.2d 397 (Sup. Ct. Madison
County 1938), the court suggested that the defendant would have the right to examine the
plaintiff prior to an inquest resulting from a default. The Glove City court observed: "[T]he
procedure in proving damages upon an assessment. . . on a default. . . seems to be substan-
tially the same as upon a trial . . . .[A bill of particulars] is as necessary and useful upon
an assessment of damages as upon a trial." Id. at 604-05, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 400.
' Absent a specific statutory provision, a grand jury witness does not have a right to
the presence of an attorney. See, e.g., United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113, 118 (2d Cir. 1955);
In re Black, 47 F.2d 542, 543 (2d Cir. 1931); People v. Waters, 27 N.Y.2d 553, 555, 261 N.E.2d
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